Inside Peacekeeping in Darfur

Talking to/past/with/about each other

2009-04-24T03:13:00.000-07:00

The 2nd regular Human Rights Forum in West Darfur this past Tuesday was either a huge success, an unmitigated disaster, or somewhere in-between – depending on how you look at it.

Flying home from the event, the small plane bounced over heat waves rising from the desert floor. Before long, a man in front of me leaned forward to vomit. As my seatmate handed him an air bag with one hand, she turned to me and cheerfully exclaimed, “I think today was great success… I mean, the government spoke openly about sexual violence!”

They did, I guess. Technically, the Government Human Rights Council brought up sexual violence only to accuse international monitors of fabricating reports. But, in the strange world of human rights reporting in Darfur, where symbolism often triumphs over substance, this could be a great leap forward.

The forum is intended to be a dialogue between the Government of Sudan and human rights monitors about modalities of reporting, such as monitors’ access to prisons and medical verification – But a lot can happen (or go wrong) when the universalist ideals of the human rights movement confront the realpolitik of implementation; When the West meets the Rest; And when human rights monitors actually meet the ‘monitored.’

Darfur human rights actors – both local and international, grass roots and institutional - have relied on a strategy to name and shame the perpetrators of violence in order to create public pressure and encourage behavioral change. The Save Darfur Coalition, Sudan divestment campaign, and even some rebel groups, among others, have been wildly successful in creating public awareness of human rights abuses in Darfur.

This public awareness has, in turn, influenced human rights reporting in Darfur - both in the way it is conducted and the in attitude that participants take towards each other. Now, although the nature of the conflict has changed from large scale atrocities to more subtle posturing and rampant insecurity, the legacy of the early movement remains.

The forum embodies the awkward situation existing today, where ‘namers and shamers’ – international human rights organizations - are expected to come face to face and work productively with the ‘shamed’ – the Sudanese Government and other perpetrators – to create change.

The Sudanese Government representative opened the reporting debate by cataloguing faults in published UN reports, implying that the incidents of sexual violence were wildly exaggerated and poorly documented, and that the language was imprecise and inflammatory. The human rights team leader deflected responsibility by saying her office did not specifically author the reports mentioned. At lunch I asked the team leader how she thought it went. “I think we did really well,” she said. “We had an answer prepared for that one.”

Like my colleague on the plane, she is right. But neither the answer or the question engaged the modalities of reporting and verification, nor addressed ways to improve communication or reduce the incidents.

It seems both sides want to move forward from this ideological imposed impasse. The human rights movement wants to transform itself from an outside whistle-blower to an engaged and relevant actor on the ground. To do this they must give up showmanship for scholarship, journalism for legalism, and symbolism for substance.

The Sudanese government wants to free itself from its negative reputation regarding human rights abuses in order move forward into new elections and new relationships with the international community. But to do so, it must listen and respond to the concerns voiced by international monitors.

The forum’s existence reflects the roles the two sides want to play, not the ones they currently do - but it offers great hope for the future.

Thier Future vs Our Future

2009-03-28T07:41:00.000-07:00

The expulsion of aid groups from Darfur will have important consequences not only for beneficiaries, but for the very future of humanitarian action worldwide.

Public debate on the expulsions of 13 NGOs has so far focused on the immediate humanitarian consequences – a possible meningitis outbreak, water supply and food distribution gaps, mass population movements, etc - and calls for the Government of Sudan to reverse its decision.

But the fact that the international community is calling for a reversal of the expulsions rather than pursuing legal recourse, reveals a deeper issue at the heart of the controversy - namely, the ambiguous legal status of today’s humanitarian organizations and their work.

Humanitarian assistance is enshrined in international law, but so limited as to be unrecognizable to those familiar with the operations of today’s multi-billion dollar a year industry.

For one, the Geneva conventions guarantee the right of the populations to receive life-saving assistance, but not the right of givers to give such aid. So, theoretically, a government could refuse humanitarian assistance from some actors if the populations’ needs were met by another group.

But the world seems to have moved beyond a limited interpretation of humanitarian assistance as meeting the immediate needs of suffering populations to view humanitarian organizations as moral arbitrators, public-opinion makers, and the embodiment of an international consciousness - both speaking out and acting against wrongs.

As a result, many of today’s organizations are walking on a tight-rope between neutrality and advocacy, between serving the immediate needs of populations, and trying to influence the root causes of suffering by speaking out against violations.

For aid agencies that remain on the ground in Darfur who must now decide whether to remain, expand, or retreat, the expulsions have spurred soul-searching as to exactly which role they should play. This is a critical opportunity for the international community to reflect on the changing role of humanitarian organizations in the technology-saturated global village of the 21st century - answering such questions as:

Can confidentiality exist in a world of digital photos? (During the Abu Graib scandal, once the photos of torture were release, ICRC was severely criticized for not speaking out about the abuses earlier)

Can we speak locally in a world of global polarization? (moderate statements designed to influence local political actors to improve the humanitarian situation can be taken out of context and manipulated by extremists on both sides to influence the political process)

Can apolitical agencies effectively separately themselves from hybrid political-military-humanitarian interventions such as exist in Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur and Congo? (if NGOs are seen as being ‘too Western,’ perhaps because their headquarters are in Europe, they may be perceived as part of a military intervention and hence a legitimate target for reprisals or attack)

Tension has been building on the subject ever since the 1970s when ex-ICRC staff, disgruntled with the strict speech embargo placed on the organization’s employees during the Biafra war, founded MSF and chartered a new course for humanitarianism that both meets needs and raises awareness of disasters.

And for the past two decades, in the age of celebrity activism, you-tube, and terrorism, humanitarians have struggled to play a role of ‘pragmatic neutrality’ -operating with sufficient discretion to “maintain the appearance on non-involvement in the politics of conflict (HPG Report),” but conducting sufficient public advocacy to maintain a seat at the policy table, secure funding, or influence the root causes of war.

This leads us to the slightly ironic situation in which aid groups have been accused of taking a stand on politics and security and have been evicted from the country (perhaps having chosen to emphasize the political over the humanitarian), and the UN Security Council, entrusted with maintaining international peace and security, has issued a statement stressing the reverse, namely, the importance of the humanitarian over the political. Yesterday, the Security Council, unable to reach consensus earlier this month on a statement vis a vis the ICC, instead stressed the importance of "continuing the distribution of humanitarian assistance to all the needy in Darfur."

This is a golden opportunity to transform the chaos of Darfur into more clarity for international humanitarian law.

Hunger Strike

2009-03-25T00:04:00.000-07:00

Residents, or at least a few powerful leaders, of Kalma camp in South Darfur and two other camps in North Darfur have rejected offers of humanitarian assistance.

In both written and spoken statements, camp spokesmen claim they cannot accept national or international NGOs that were not expelled from the country to fill the gaps in medical, sanitation, schooling or other services left by the recent expulsions of nearly half of the aid organizations operating in Darfur.

At best, this refusal represents the consensus of a group of violence-affected and wary residents mistrustful of the intentions of the government - believing that any agency left operating in Darfur is either too biased or too weak to be of any good.

At worst, the refusal is the result of manipulative rebel leaders wagering the suffering of their supporters against the possibility of portraying a negative media image of the Sudanese regime.

In theory, it doesn’t matter. Humanitarianism, by its very nature, is supposed to be above the fray. As long as civilians are suffering during wartime due to factors beyond their control, humanitarian workers should provide assistance.

Yet, it seems to matter. Engaging with IDP leaders who have refused aid (through dialogue, persuasion, or negotiation) in order to continue providing services sets a disturbing precedent. The refusal will continue until leaders feel they are loosing more than they are gaining from the current tactic – which may be after a significant number of deaths. And anything we, as a humanitarian community, give to these leaders is chalked up in the gains column (be it legitimacy, political advocacy, or physical assistance).

At the very least, the leaders should be held publicly accountable for the crimes.

In Darfur in the past year, there have been many examples of such 'humanitarian bargaining'. In one camp, fearing a retaliatory attack by militia groups after killing some members of the groups, residents of one West Darfur IDP camp took hostages and demanded the arrival of UN ‘protection’ troops before their release.

In another case, camp leaders in North Darfur refused access to UNAMID police and military patrols for months until compensation was paid to the owner of a motorcycle damaged by a UNAMID vehicle during an earlier patrol.

One of the most valuable commodities that IDPs have ownership of is their own image as victims/recipients. For Darfuris, that image has become quite prominent and hence a powerful negotiating tool – perhaps, an unintended consequences of the huge American advocacy campaign for action in Darfur.

The question now, is how far are we willing to compromise humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality to give aid? Can we let a group of people dictate the terms of aid just to ease our conscience over letting people die in faraway places?

How is this refusal substantively different than the Sudanese government’s harassment of NGOs - except without the excuse of sovereignty?

Should the leaders who have orchestrated the refusal be condemned publicly by UNAMID for the crime of denying humanitarian access to suffering civilians?

A Lot Can Change in Three Weeks

2009-02-14T01:26:00.000-08:00

The pace of change in Darfur has been blindingly fast over the past weeks - we’ve seen JEM take and then withdraw from Muhajeriya town, their flight and pursuit by GoS across a wide swath of Darfur, an alleged preemptive attack by JEM on the GoS stronghold on Malam, sustained bombardment of vast areas and a huge population movement, shifting alliances and surprise fighting between groups and former allies on the ground, peace talks beginning in Doha concurrently with a high level UN leak about the ICC warrant and subsequent denial by the ICC.

One theory holds that it has all been an accident – that the clash in Muhajeriya in mid-January which sparked the rest was an accidental escalation of a personal feud between two mid level commanders. Once the fighting started, JEM took the town and then didn’t know quite what to do with it.

Regardless of the reasons, the consequences have been enormous - and the disjointed response by peacekeepers and the international community has again shown that the intellectual challenges of peacekeeping are often far greater that the physical.

Two major consequences of the fighting have presented serious dilemmas to the mission. The first is the sudden and unexpected movement of thousands people from South Darfur (Muhajeriya, Sheria, Abu Dangal, and surrounding villages) to over-crowded camps in North Darfur. The second is the equally unexpected wave of shifting alliances which has left unclear who is in control of which territory and where things may lead.

The first priority is attending to the immediate food, shelter, hygiene, and medical needs of thousands of exhausted and dehydrated displaced. Yet the numbers and method of displacement has raised questions that may influence the way aid is delivered. The organization of the displaced - most have arrived on rented trucks packed with belongings – has caused speculation that the movement is a deliberate relocation of SLA/M supporters to areas of humanitarian relief to ensure provisions for the armed group as it looses territory. If the arrivals are a blatant ploy, how should humanitarians respond?

Additional speculation exists as to why the displaced have come so far north when there are closer camps and areas of refuge. It could be a natural tendency to displace towards kinship groups, or it could be a conscious return-migration - most of the new displaced are Zaghawa communities originally from North Darfur who relocated to the Muhajeriya area during a severe drought in 1973. In the latter case, their arrival could complicate the return process significantly. How should humanitarians assist communities who are potentially moving to reclaim old land they haven’t inhabited in 30 years?

On the political front, the first sign of shifting alliances was the surprise disarming if SLA/M (a partner in the government) by GoS discussed in my previous post, and the quick power changes continue to cause confusion. The movement of JEM fighters hundreds of miles from their bases in Chad to Muhajeriya and back again created suspicion between armed groups on the ground that one or the other was complicit in the attack. This tension is particularly apparent between GoS and SLA/M (the sole signatory of a peace agreement) combatants who have joint-control of some areas of Darfur. These suspicions have caused assassinations, proxy battles, and retaliation resulting in hundreds of deaths and a deterioration of confidence slowly built since the partnership was established in 2005.

The smaller, fringe rebel movements are shifting gears quickly trying to stay on the winning side of the battle, and many are hiring out to either side of the conflict. It is now unclear who controls large parts of North Darfur – including the volatile areas where humanitarian presence is most needed.

The uncertainty of what may happen in coming weeks has been reflected in the same-day announcement and denial of the decision to issue an ICC warrant for President Bashir. I believe the leak of the decision by the UN was deliberate. Because things are changing so quickly on the ground the UN does not want to situation to stabilize (with an agreement between GoS and JEM) and then be thrown off again by the warrant. I think the leak was intended to allow commanders to take the facts into consideration during the times of instability, so that a warrant won’t come as a shock.

A Military Ethic

2009-02-01T07:22:00.000-08:00

UNAMID issued a strange denial yesterday of rumors claiming it had transported armed combatants from one place in Darfur to another. The denial was true, but barely – the combatants weren’t armed at the time they were transferred - and the incident illustrates the continued dominance of a military ethic over a civilian one within UNAMID which marginalizes civil society relative to armed groups in Darfur.

During the fighting in Muhajeriya in South Darfur earlier this month (in was has become a familiar seen in Congo, the Balkans and elsewhere) hundreds of civilians crowded around the UN base seeking protection from the cross-fire of battling JEM and SLA/M (Minni Minnawi) ground troops and later, GoS air bombardment.

The public details are fuzzy, but at some point GoS forces, having realized that the government-affiliated SLA/M troops would be defeated, intervened to forcibly disarm the group before JEM could acquire their weapons. Hundreds of disarmed and vulnerable ex-combatants (SLA/M) then arrived at the UNAMID compound seeking protection and were inexplicably given entry by the commanding officers of the base.

Despite the questionable legality of this move, once the men were inside, the mission was forced to care for them. The fighters were eventually transported by UNAMID helicopter with their consent to more friendly territory in Darfur.

There may have been some rationale behind the decision to admit the disarmed troops and not the civilians – 1) the combatants seeking protection were a smaller group than the civilian population and 2) the SLA/M combatants would more likely have been targeted by victorious JEM rebels - But the incident was clearly a violation of the fundamental principles of humanitarian law prioritizing the sanctity of civilian life in combat.

The series of decisions made during this crisis reveal the prioritization of military concerns over civilian ones within the Mission which has potentially contributed to militarization of the conflict.

The African Union mediated Darfur peace talks in Abuja in 2005 were widely criticized for giving armed factions a much larger seat at the negotiating table than unarmed civil society groups. Since these talks there has been an effort to include civil society in various peace initiatives, but partiality towards armed groups continues on the ground.

UNAMID civilian staff are limited to permanent deployment in the three Darfur capitals while UNAMID military are deployed widely at team sites across the states. The UNAMID military staff on the ground often forge stronger relations with the armed combatants within their area of responsibility, than the civilians. UNAMID commanders develop relationships with rebel and army commanding officers, and rely on each other for information, protection, and logistical arrangements

When an incident of note occurs, civilian staff may conduct 1, 2 or 3 day field mission to the team sites where they interact with a wide variety of civilians. But without being on the ground permanently, UNAMID civilian staff are unable to build lasting relationships with teachers, doctors, artisans, police, local leaders and others.

The majority of information received and disseminated by UNAMID is skewed towards armed groups and filtered through the relations of armed actors on the ground. When calls for more peacekeepers are made in the international press, it must be noted that these “peacekeepers” are not experts in humanitarian law, and their presence on the ground may actually elevate military over civilian actors in the conflict.

More troops may not be the answer – but rather a new focus on building functioning and lasting relations with a cross-section of Darfur society and the deployment of civilian staff more widely.

Visiting a Sick Person

2009-01-31T05:05:00.000-08:00

A delegation of IDP leadership in El Fasher approached UNAMID in December to warn that January would be a violent period. They felt exposed to retaliation by government-affiliated militia if a warrant was issued by the ICC for President Bashir, and claimed that both rebels and government would be consolidating their positions in the lead up to a political upheaval that would reconfigure the peace process.

Fearing for their own well-being and for the safety of UNAMID, the delegation asked what UNAMID troops intended to do if security deteriorated during the month. Senior mission officials assured the IDP delegation that UNAMID would continue regular patrols to provide safety for civilians throughout Darfur.

One Omda summed up his theory of UNAMID patrols’ contribution to safety in the camps with the comment “You know, we (camp residents) are not opposed to UNAMID patrols - as ineffective as they may be - but the patrols are a bit like sending a friend to visit a sick person in the hospital. The show of solidarity is nice, but it won’t heal the problem.”

Returing to a New Darfur

2009-01-30T04:49:00.001-08:00

I recently landed in El Fasher after three weeks of vacation aboard the last flight to slip in to Darfur before a series of rebel movements and GoS bombing in the area shut down the airport.

Dropping my bags off at home, the ceiling fan and glasses were rattling from the nearby bombardment and I decided not to unpack quite yet. UNAMID still seems to have one foot in Darfur and one foot out - never quite deciding if they will run at the first instance of attack or stay throughout.

The Darfuris can sense this equivocation and the first question residents of one displaced persons camp asked me was why UNAMID had stropped patrolling since the bombing began. When I asked the police commander I was assured that the patrols were continuing from strategic vantage points within the town. Given the topography of El Fasher, I eventually learned this meant climbing trees and observing the camps with binoculars. Residents were needless to say not assured by this, but also not too worried. It appears the bombing was concentrated on JEM positions and there were few civilian casualties.

Most of the projects I was working on before I left are now largely irrelevant. The fast-pace of military and political change in Darfur often means a new start and new analysis every time you come back from leave.

In the office my boss assured me to continue planning activities as normal and that there would be no evacuation in the near future. But arriving home that night, I found my house mate (who works in supply chain) packing for Entebbe, Uganda where he would be coordinating the foreseen evacuation.

Most people blame this schizophrenic direction on the dual political commands received by the mission from its African Union and United Nations bosses (particularly in regards to support for or criticism of the ICC indictment). But I see a fundamental disagreement between the humanitarian side (political affaires, human rights, etc) and the administrative/logistic side of the mission. Humanitarians seem to operate under the assumption that the UN and its member states are willing to risk lives for the ideals of the Geneva conventions and civilian protection during war time.

It remains to be seen which direction one will win out…but the Mission’s upper management did collectively agree that if we do evacuate it will not in fact be called an evacuation (because that sounds too much like we are abandoning the people of Darfur) but rather a "relocation." 

The Shoe and the Truth

2008-12-27T22:19:00.001-08:00

The Shoe/Bush incident is the talk of the town. The Sudanese I spoke to let out an involuntary peal of laughter the first time they saw or heard, but quickly assumed disapproving expressions. The Sudanese, they claim, are quieter, more restrained, particularly in the face of authority. You would never see a Sudanese throw a shoe at anyone, they tell me.

(But when I ask why it is bad or good to throw shoes I get answers like ‘its bad because then the authority will be angry and it will make your life more difficult.’ It seems when life is already of a certain degree of difficulty, morality falls away and all that’s left are practical concerns.)

To me the footage is only meaningful with the sound on. The visual image is just an angry man. But the audio of Bush being cut off in mid-sentence – proclaiming friendship and ‘parting gifts to the Iraqi people’ - with a loud thud lends an ‘emperor’s new clothes’ side to the story. A lone man standing up for truth.

Its one thing for leaders to make foreign policy mistakes or at least to watch major unintended consequences of their actions unravel. But its another thing to pretend its not happening.

The Bush incident was embarrassing to many Iraqis (and Sudanese). But not nearly as embarrassing as Bush’s State of the Middle East Speech a week earlier was to me. I keep telling my Sudanese friends that Americans are more honest than that, more down-to-earth. That you would never see a true American stand before a wounded country and say things not remotely connected to reality.

Lessons from the Peace Corps

2008-12-27T22:16:00.000-08:00

I was a Peace Corps volunteer before joining the UN. In training, a few weeks into your stay in a new country, they make you do an exercise called “community mapping” to learn the two most essential skills of community intervention.

The trainers drive you out to a small village, assemble the villagers, give you a pen and paper and tell you to sketch out a map of the existing village structures and services and identify needs for new ones.

Half the battle is explaining to a group of unsuspecting villagers who you are and what it is you are doing standing in the dirt in front of them with a pen and paper. The rest of the battle is learning how to listen. Vast differences between you and them soon become apparent – perhaps you don’t know what a gari mill is, and they definitely have no idea how to conceive of a map. Somehow you have to meet in the middle.

The point of this story is that UNAMID needs to get better at 1) explaining what it is and why it is there, and 2) relaying messages back from the community about what their needs are. This two-way communication is supposed to happen on daily “confidence building patrols” which consist of a few cars of police and military personnel driving around camps and villages and stopping to talk to people. These patrols constitute the vast majority of UNAMID’s billion-dollar-a-year contact with its constituency - rural Darfuris affected by the conflict.

But very little has been invested in developing these essential skills in police and military and in the translators through which their interactions are channeled. Going along on patrol you can’t help but notice some camp residents give blank stares in response to questions – they don’t know why UNAMID people are there and what they expect to offer. Others say everything is fine, having long ago given up hope that anyone is actually listening to what they say..

If you can’t communicate, you’re just someone with a pen and paper in the dirt.

The ICC and the US

2008-12-27T22:12:00.003-08:00

I keep seeing editorials in respectable newspapers exhorting the US government to act to ensure that justice is not delayed in Darfur through a Security Council deferral of the arrest warrant for President Bashir.

A group of prominent Darfur experts wrote an open letter to Barrack Obama claiming that since Briton and France were negotiating with Sudan over the charges – trying to leverage major concessions in exchange for a deferral - the US must step into the moral vacuum and ensure that justice prevails, presumably in order to prevent dictators around the world from thinking they are immune to war cirmes charges.

Which would all sound a lot better if the US had not shied away from ratifying the Rome Statue creating the ICC for fear that its people would not be immune from war crimes charges.

Condilezza Rice has just outlined an expensive step by step plan for strengthening international justice mechanisms. But the single most meaningful gesture the US could carry out to strengthen the legitimacy of the charges against President Bashir and to raise the stakes of continued defiance of the law by the Sudanese government is to ratify the court's documents.

End of a Long Silence

2008-12-27T22:11:00.000-08:00

I haven’t written in a long time, I apologize – I’ve been traveling a lot and I lost my USB drive with all my rambling writings somewhere in the sand. Its Christmas time now, and things have settled down a bit. Most people are on holiday.

President Bashir came to El Fasher yesterday. The weeks leading up were filled with frantic preparation – painting the curbs black and white, hanging Sudanese flags along the road, rushing to finish construction on the new mosque, military hospital, and ministry buildings. The frenzy of activity built up until the night before when hundreds of workers were still putting up power lines, sweeping the streets, and hammering – I half expected to wake up the next day in a reformed city, with shiny cars, nice buildings, and people singing in the streets.

Bashir’s arrival after all the preparation was anticlimactic, despite the significantly increased amount of armed men careening about town in pick-up trucks. He gave a speech promising peace and a new road to Khartoum, but my Sudanese colleagues were unimpressed.

The most drama occurred when residents of the displaced persons’ camp refused to allow Bashir’s convoy to pass by the camp on its way to the “model village” he was opening and inviting them to live in - so he had to travel the two kilometers by helicopter.

The Wrong Tools

2008-11-07T23:46:00.000-08:00

Mohammed poked at the dry lump of rice on his plate which had been offered as lunch by the Nigerian contingent - “They can’t even cook food to eat, how do you think they are going to protect a community?” he asks. We are staying at a ‘teamsite’ – the small bases that are the AU-UN peacekeeping mission’s only presence in Darfur outside of the three regional capitals. Each houses about 150 military and 100 police who monitor armed movements and conduct daily patrols around the community.

Mohammed, who is from a minority tribe in Darfur, sees power politics clearly, with no comforting allusions. It has been a disheartening day and the lack of edible food is a good indicator of the difficulties faced by peacekeepers – impossible supply chains, low morale, and an uneasy relationship with the local community.

Landing here, you think the helicopter pilot has made a mistake. The first sign of life is a solitary soldier guarding the rocky landing spot, and behind him emerges the barbed wire and sand bladder cage representing an airport. Once you descend squinting into the harsh light you start to see subtle texture to the rocky landscape that is vegetation, crumbling houses and a donkey or two.

Kutum sits on the side of a dry river bed along a major nomadic route from Lybia to the Central African Republic and used to be a trading center of some fame (Wilfred Thesiger was stationed here as a young British Colonial Officer). Its centrality has also made it one of the epicenters of violence in the Darfur conflict with a long and twisting history of attacks.

The town is flanked by two huge displaced person camps – refugees from the battle waged between Government and rebel groups for control of their lands. The camps are in turn flanked by armed militia and camp inhabitants venturing out to plant crops or gather firewood are periodically harassed – assaulted, beaten, shot at, crops trampled and donkeys stolen. Although rumors of impending attacks are flying through town– after decades of instability the residents are good at predicting battles - the most immediate problem seems to be the crime and impunity which prevents (by design or not) people from going about their livelihoods.
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The first stop on a patrol with the UN peacekeepers is the GoS (Government of Sudan) Police station. UNAMID's mandate does not allow for the investigation of crimes or arrest of perpetrators - it is limited to the ‘protection of civilians under imminent threat’ ie. intervention either immediately prior to or during the criminal act. In cases where a crime has been reported after the fact, UNAMID's soldiers, police, and civilians can only pressure the government to fulfill its duty in investigating the crimes. And, though the GoS police’s motivation to investigate may be questionable, their ability is not. The perpetrators are both better armed and better connected. Heavily armed and turbaned men hovering around the police station listening to every word, press this point.

In the past, in line with traditions that allowed for the governing of immense inhospitable terrain, the police would call the leaders of a suspect's tribe to come account for his or her crime. But the old guard no longer has control, and showing up at the police station to admit it would be both humiliating and dangerous. Guns and salaries offered by the government have bent the loyalties of the tribes’ youth and destroyed the authority of their elders.

Exactly which guns and salaries are giving to which militia by the government is debatable, but few dispute that the GoS - having come to power in a coup - recognizes the danger of a military and is hedging its bets by supporting at least a few distinct armed groups. A result which Mohammed sums up as putting the entire town at the mercy of 13 year olds smoking marijuana in the bush waiting for orders on their satellite phones.

Residents are understandably frustrated that the relatively well-equipped peacekeepers can do little to improve their day-to-day situation. They complain that when the African Union mission turned over to the AU-UN mission, the soldiers only changed their hats – in truth, in many cases the soldiers only painted their old helmets blue. But the problem is not the quality of the peacekeepers; it is that of the mandate.

The mission may be successful in peace negotiations with its current mandate to protect civilians under threat of attack, but if it wants to make an immediate difference in the lives of civilians it needs to address crime.

The issue is hugely complicated – the power to arrest could, in a worst case scenario, make the UN a party to the conflict. And in a better case scenario, put the UN in the awkward position of choosing to dispense ‘international’ justice on an unwilling population or handing suspects over to either government or rebel forces that would likely kill them. But the purpose of a peacekeeping mission is to protect civilians, and if the threat to civilians is evolving, so must the mandate of the mission.

Humanitarian's Access

2008-10-24T04:48:00.000-07:00

Media reports this week cite growing concern over ‘denial of humanitarian access’ in Darfur. Although such denial certainly exists, many of the actors being denied – in the form of travel bans, visa refusals, car-jacking, etc - are not strict ‘humanitarians,’ but a loose community of NGO’s whose right to intervene is debatable.

International law guarantees the protection of humanitarian space and actors – defined as neutral and impartial – in order to meet pressing needs of a population in wartime. The International Committee of the Red Cross as well as a few other agencies, such as MSF (Medecines Sans Frontiers) who define themselves by these focused principles, continue to fulfill this role.

But because human rights and civilian protection norms have expanded, the NGO community now includes organizations focused on education, counseling, women’s empowerment and other services. Which means, more and more, NGO’s are claiming the right of access, but not the responsibility. Their staff are not specialists in humanitarian law, the organizations participate in advocacy, provide statements to the media, or are linked with public figures. Yet, they still cry ‘denial of humanitarian access’ when their activities are blocked.

Humanitarian is a word used to self-describe - it’s not a laissez-passe to the destination of choice. NGO’s are guests in the countries in which they operate and can, legally, be expelled. Forfeiting neutrality means forfeiting the right to be present.

This conundrum is a stark reality in Darfur where an NGO setting up a medical clinic must face the decision to treat rape cases silently day-after-day, or to speak out against the violence and risk being expelled. Any NGO that chooses to be vocal knows they are making it more difficult for other organizations to establish care-facilities.

This problem has been exacerbated by the shrinking international state presence in Africa since the cold war. Now, when major events happen, the media and the Western world turn to the NGO’s on the ground for information and guidance. But an NGO that has made political statements in Uganda, cannot claim humanitarian status in Darfur.

So what does this mean for Darfuris? Confusion, duplication, obstruction, and lack of trust. A woman reporting a rape is never quite sure if it will be confidential – to whom or where the report will go. NGO’s repeat each others’ work because anyone conducting a nutrition or education assessment is reluctant to make it public. This has entrenched a culture of secrecy, competition, and non-transparency, as everyone tries to hide under the umbrella of humanitarian law.

Some organizations, such as Human rights Watch, have stepped boldly out into new territory – reporting and advocating very effectively but not maintaining a presence on the ground. The two extreme types of organizations (humanitarian and watch-dog) operate effectively under current international law, but the range in between is lost in the blurring lines.

We need a redefinition of terms and a rethinking of norms of access to allow different agencies to fulfill different roles. And we should start by clarifying the terms. Celebrities are not humanitarians, they are activists. OCHA – The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affaires - is also the Office for the Coordination of NGO activity.

The government of a host country can and should be condemned for expelling organizations who report on rape and other topics – as a violation of free speech, or failure to protect its people – but is this really denial of humanitarian access?

Genocide by Urbanization?

2008-10-15T07:31:00.000-07:00

“Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation… it is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.”
Raphael Lemkin, credited with coining the word 'genocide,' 1943

A warrant for the arrest of President Bashir (indicted by the ICC on crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in July) is expected any day, and it’s making everyone jumpy. It’s also ensuring that the topic comes up a lot in conversation– is Darfur, or is it not, properly called genocide?

Given that Ocampo, the ICC prosecutor, has staked his reputation and possibly the courts very survival on this case, I imagine he holds a ‘smoking gun’ piece of evidence on the subject. But, from what the international community has seen in the last few years, I think Darfur is genocide mainly in the second part of the definition - the long term destruction of a culture, leadership institutions, livelihoods, and way of life.

Humanitarians estimate that as many as 10,000 people were displaced this week alone in South Darfur, with the number killed in the 20’s and 30’s (The numbers of displaced in Darfur have consistently been far greater than those killed). Imagine rural America – Wyoming and Utah for example, as the last frontier of the American West – and swaths of people, 10,000 at a time, forced off their land and to the edges of Salt Lake City until 2.5 million people were camped out. The economy ceases to function, land is up for grabs, herds, gene pools, and knowledge die off, infrastructure is destroyed or abandoned, irrigation systems collapse and the land reverts to the wild. Social organization unwinds and people’s self-worth and faith in humanity is tested. Resentment builds and identities change.

But, if I take only those criteria, then Darfur is genocide by ultra rapid (albeit, targeted) urbanization. Across Africa communities are abandoning traditional fields for city slums in reaction to a group of push and pull factors similar to those in Darfur. Environmental degradation and population growth are reducing productivity and increasing competition in the country side. Rumors of wealth and jobs (often at international companies and organizations) to be found in urban areas are pulling people to the city centers, where they find the reality does not always match their expectations.

New arrivals at displaced camps here in Darfur are often happier than you would expect them to be – awed by the new people and surroundings, treated as guests by their fellow camp-mates, telling their story to people who care, and expecting food and schooling. The reality of the tedium and degradation of displaced life takes a little while to set in. And the possibility of returning dims as instability increases, land ownership is confused and social ties mixed-up.

We tend to think of refugees as temporary, but they are much more often permanent. When there is finally peace in Darfur, the challenges faced by the population will be very similar to those around the world – building habitable cities and adapting to modern legal and cultural institutions.

The violence in Darfur is unique and very real, but the effects are at least comparable to the rapid and increasingly desperate urbanization happening around the developing world - does the fact that one group of people is forcing another into this situation qualify it as genocide?

Toxic Justice

2008-10-13T07:48:00.000-07:00

A recent article in the New York Times claimed that the US Supreme Court’s influence on legal institutions around the world is waning – a result of the US’s departure from the path of multilateralism and universal human rights.

But even if the formal judicial influence of America is fading, our informal quasi-judicial concepts are spreading quickly and effectively.

Soon after ‘terr’rist’ became a household word in the United States, governments around the world dismissively labeled rebels, journalists, and human rights organizers as terrorists. And, when US courts decided that ‘foreign fighters’ are not entitled to habeas corpus, they made it much easier for other regimes to get off the rule-of-law hook with anyone who could feasibly be called a ‘foreign fighter.’

And now, so quickly, the lingo of the financial crises is spreading - Greed and toxicity can conveniently be blamed for everything. Instead of bucking up and calling the crisis what it is - regulatory weakness, mismanagement, political pressure, risky trading, etc - we can call it a “toxic spread.”

Now in Sudan, we start to see the International Criminal Court’s indictment of the president on genocide charges labeled as ‘toxic,’ and the result of Western ‘greed.’

This is part of what I find so scary about Govenor Palin’s debate lingo - Blaming vague, nebulous, and evil concepts for real problems legitimizes them. We might think the tendency of American political rhetoric to blame issues on ‘predators,’ ‘extremists,’ and ‘snobs’ could only be damaging to ourselves, but it goes much further.

Complexity

2008-10-11T05:40:00.000-07:00

A lot has been written lately on the complexity of the Darfur Crisis – armed groups have splintered and lawlessness has led to an increase in banditry and opportunism. Pundits disagree on the numbers killed and displaced, the main perpetrators, and the moral lines.

But very little has been written on the complexity of the humanitarian response itself. There seems to be a general consensus that if we had more humanitarians on the ground, things would be better. Little is said of the legal and ethical lines being walked by the international community, not to mention the almost insurmountable physical challenges to successful peacekeeping in the area.

Iraq analysis has often served as a foil to Darfur in the media - the discussion of the complex internal dynamics in Iraq fueling a civil war, the perception of American troops on the ground, etc vs. the characterization of an Arab ‘genocide’ in Darfur – so much so that some Darfur advocacy groups have pushed the slogan “Out of Iraq and Into Darfur.”

Missing from the Darfur issue is public discussion on the interface between humanitarians and the place, the people, and the conflict. Humanitarians, by their very motives, seem excused from this scrutiny. But, the international presence in Darfur is similar to interventions elsewhere, like Iraq, and has an enormous impact on an inter-state conflict. There is no such thing as a neutral - and a balanced impact is the best we can hope for. Our presence can fuel an insurgency, give legitimacy to armed groups, provide targets that win popular support, increase arms availability, etc.

Imagine first the physical challenges - UNAMID is a billion dollar a year mission, pasted on to a small town in an enormous desert. Fuel, generator parts, computers, paper, pens, chairs….everything…must be shipped by sea to Port Sudan, where the containers are unloaded onto trucks for 3,000 mile journey, 1,000 of which are not only unpaved, but untracked. The trucks must go around each little bush, into and out of each little ravine. And upon arrival they must be unloaded without a crane.

There are 10,000 people in the Mission who need heath care, food, water, and benefits. We are building a medium sized city from scratch, with mostly imported goods, in the middle of Africa. Imagine.

Which lead to the political challenges - Thousands of displaced people see the cars and trucks going by, but haven’t yet seen much improvement or tangible support. Men on horseback with AK-47s hijack Armored Personal Carriers because the UN cannot afford (politically) to shoot ‘civilians.’ Fuzzy relations with contractors hired to build the city who may have fuzzy relations with any number of groups creates conflicts on interest.

There is opportunism on all sides. Displaced Persons’ camp leaders exaggerate numbers to increase relief supplies. NGOs exaggerate problems or their ability to solve them to increase funding.

And there is tension between all the actors in a very stressful, high-stakes situation. Some NGOs have already been pressured to leave Darfur by the government, claiming that their work contributed to the evidence in the ICC documents indicting President Bashir. Some organizations emphasis on accountability prevents others from working, and vise versa.

These are the type of issues I will explore, hopefully slower and more coherently, in this blog :)

Human Rights Relavitism

2008-10-11T05:09:00.000-07:00

Recently, considering law school, I sat in on a class discussion of legal ethics. The students largely condemned the ‘ambulance chasing’ lawyer, concluding that it is immoral to search out victims to exploit for personal greed – and many went on to express their desire to be human rights advocates instead.

Which got me thinking about my own job – documenting human rights violations in Darfur, where our strongest tool is often reporting and advocacy. We search out victims to find evidence which can be used to leverage reform, but also, to publicize our own mission, to accrue funding, and to make ourselves feel better.

The same point could be made for some of the great civil rights cases of our time. Jane Doe was not a desperate woman standing up for her rights in court as a last resort. She most probably would have secured an illegal abortion, as she had done at least once before. Instead she was found by a group of lawyers looking for a pregnant woman willing to sign on the dotted line so they could challenge the constitutionality of abortion bans.

Some civil rights activists used to attempt to be discriminated against, so they could bring charges. Is this different from ‘slipping’ on the ice in front of a store to sue for damages? Hmmmmmmm.

I remember my father once told me coming to Africa would be good for me because I would become a relativist. Thios week we heard a humanitarian organization's garbage collection truck was car-jacked in Darfur - which sounds worse that it does when you elaborate that it was car-jacked while dumping waste in the desert outside of town :)

Introduction

2008-10-11T05:04:00.001-07:00

This is a new blog for me. An attempt to be informal, honest and to keep my parents informed – a poor substitute for the sunset, sun-downer talks we can have when I’m at home.

I recently re-deployed with the African Union/United Nations Joint Peace Keeping Mission in Darfur, and posts will largely be my reflections on the situation. You might be shocked to discover a lot of them focus on the international response to the conflict and not the actual conflict, but that’s what I’m thinking about for now.